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SAMEVATTING
Die beheer en kontrole van hedendaagse stelsels word bemoeilik as
gevolg van die kompleksiteit daarvan. Die tradisionele benadering tot
die audit van rekenaarsekerheid in moderne rekenaaromgewings is
nie meer toepaslik nie. Die behoefte aan alternatiewe benaderings
word hierdeur ondersteun.
Die komplekse SAP R/3 omgewing is geevalueer ten op sigte van
sekerheid en die geldigheid van gebruikers en verwerking, deur die
toepassing van so 'n alternatiewe ouditbenadering, naamlik die
/I Access Path" (Toegangsroete) en die "Path Context" (Roete
Konteks) Modelle. Die navorsingsmetodologie wat ontwikkel is
tydens hierdie evaluasie, mag universele moontlikhede inhou vir
soortgelyke studies van komplekse omgewings.
Die bevinding is dat daar talle fasiliteite, om sekerheid en geldigheid
van gebruikers en verwerking deur die verskillende sagteware
sleutelkomponente in die SAP R/3 omgewing, gebied word. Hierdie
fasiliteite kan met sukses aangewend word om toegangsbeheer en
geldigheid van gebruikers en verwerking te verseker. Die duplisering
.
van fasiliteite in die sagteware komponente vereis egter dat daar
globaal na die omgewing gekyk moet word om sodoende effektiewe
sekerheid en geldigheid te verseker. Deur die gebruikmaking van
matrikse wat ontwikkel is tydens hierdie navorsing, word die globale
evaluasie van die SAP R/3 omgewing vergemaklik. Alhoewel verdere
navarsing benodig word, is dit 'n aanduiding van die nut van hierdie
matrikse asook die navorsingsmetodologie.
Die toepaslikheid van die Toegangsroete en die Roete Konteks
Modelle vir die evaluering van die gedefinieerde SAP R/3 omgewing
is dus vasgestel.
ii
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OPSOMMING IN AFRIKAANS
Die doel van hierdie opsomming is om die agtergrond, metodiek en
gevolgtrekking van hierdie navorsing uiteen te sit. Die opsomming sal
as volg ingedeel word:
1. PROBLEEMOMSKRYWING EN DOEL VAN NAVORSING
2. NAVORSINGSONTWERP EN -METODIEK
3. GEVOLGTREKKING
1. PROBLEEMOMSKRYWING EN DOEL VAN NAVORSING
Versnelde ontwikkeling op tegnologiese gebiede vereis die
toepassing van nuwe beheerkonsepte om rekenaarstelsel-
sekerheid te verseker. Eksterne en interne ouditeure word
gekonfronteer met komplekse toepassingstelsels asook die
behoefte vir meer effektiewe stelselsekerheid .
.
Die aard van hedendaagse ge"integreerde stelsels soos SAP
R/3, veroorsaak dat die tradisionele benadering tot
rekenaarsekerheid of die ge"isoleerde gebruik van
sekerheidspakette, nie meer voldoende of effektief is nie.
Die logiese oplossing vir die bogenoemde probleem is om
tegnologie aan te wend om tegnologie te beheer. Alternatiewe
kontrolemodelle is dus nodig as hulpmiddel vir die beheer van
risiko's verwant aan komplekse omgewings.
iii
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Stu dies deur Boshoff (1985, 1990) het gelei tot die
ontwikkeling van die Toegangsroete Model en die Roete
Konteks Model as geldige hulpmiddels vir die evaluering van
komplekse rekenaarstelsels. Hierdie modelle volg 'n holistiese
benadering tot rekenaarsekerheid en word met sukses
aangewend om die integrasie van organisatoriese-,
administratiewe- en verwante sekerheidsbeginsels in
bogenoemde komplekse omgewings aan te spreek.
Aangesien die Toegangsroete Model en die Roete Konteks
Model beide internasionaal en nasionaal, wye erkenning geniet,
verleen dit die nodige steun vir die aanvaarding daarvan.
Die hoof redes vir hierdie navorsing is dus as volg:
1) Die leemtes en tekortkominge van tradisionele
rekenaarsekerheid en sekerheidspakette in 'n komplekse
omgewing.
2) Die beperkte gepubliseerde inligting rakende SAP R/3 en
verwante sekerheid.
3) Die toepaslikheid van die Toegangsroete Model
'(Boshoff, 1985) en die Roete Kompleks Model (Boshoff,
1990) op die geldigheid van gebruikers en verwerking,
in 'n SAP R/3 omgewing.
4) Die evaluasie vansekerheidsaspekte verwant aan die
sleutel sagtewarekomponente in 'n SAP R/3 omgewing.
5) Die eskalasie van 'n holistiese benadering tot
rekenaarsekerheid en die verwantskap tussen oordeel en
aanvaarbare sekerheidsrisiko.
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2. NAVORSINGSONTWERP EN -METODIEK
Die navorsingsontwerp van hierdie verhandeling word in Figuur 1.
saamgevat.
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Figuur 1
Die toepaslikheid van die Toegangsroete Model en Roete Konteks
Model (Boshoff 1985, 1990) op In komplekse omgewing soos SAP
R/3 sal geillustreer word.
v
\.'
Die model sal toegepas word op In gedefinieerde SAP R/3 omgewing
en spesifiek konsentreer op respektiewelik die bedryfstelsel
omgewing (UNIX), die netwerk omgewing (NOVELL NETWARE), die
databasis omgewing (ORACLE) en die toepassings omgewing (SAP
R/3) am sodoende In konseptuele raamwerk daar te stel.
In Detail studie van sleutelkomponente wat die geldigheid van data
en verwerking be"invloed, sal uitgevoer en gedokumenteer word, am
sodoende die bogenoemde konseptuele model te verfyn. Ten einde
dit te fasiliteer, sal In matriks antwerp word wat die
sleutelkomponente asook hul belangrikheid of wesenlikheid in terme
van geldigheid, omskryf. In Numeriese waarde sal aan elke
komponent gekoppel word, am sodoende die wesenlikheidsrangorde
volgens In gedefinieerde waardeskaal, aan te dui.
Die gevolgtrekking sal laastens die toepaslikheid van die
Toegangsroete Model en die Roete Konteks Model (Boshoff 1985,
1990) vir die evaluering van geldigheid van gebruikers en vewerklnq
in die gedefinieerde SAP R/3 omgewing, reflekteer.
3. GEVOLGTREKKING
Die kontrolematrikse wat antwerp is deur die toepassing van: die
Toeqanqsroete Model en die Roete Konteks Model (Boshoff 1985,
1990) kan· gebruik word vir die evaluasie van geldigheid en
toegangsbeheer as deeI van die evaluasie van interne rekenkundige
kontroles.
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Die gebruik van hierdie matriks as 'n hulpmiddel is nie slegs beperk
tot interne en eksterne ouditeure nie, maar kan deur bestuur gebruik
word as In kontrolelys om die kwaliteit van sekerheid soos deur hulle
ge"implementeer, te bepaal. Bestuur sal dus kan bepaal of die
ge"implementeerde toegangsbeheer wei voldoen aan verwagtings
soos gespesifiseer in die sekerheidsbeleid.
Alhoewel die matrikse suksesvol aangewend is vir die evaluasie van
sekerheid en toegangsbeheer in die gedefinieerde omgewing, is die
universele toepassing van die model nie bewys nie. Oit kan egter as
die grondslag dien vir verdere navorsing oor soortgelyke komplekse
omgewings of ander aspekte van die gedefinieerde omgewing, soos
byvoorbeeld die evaluasie van ander kontrole doelwitte in 'n SAP R/3
omgewing, naamlik volledigheid en akkuraatheid van invoer,
verwerking en uitvoer.
Die studie het aangedui dat 'n verskeidenheid fasiliteite deur die
sleutelkomponente gebied word om die geldigheid van gebruikers en
verwerking te verseker. Baie van die fasiliteite word egter
gedupliseer. Oit is dus essensieel om globaal na die omgewing te kyk,
om sodoende die optimale sekerheidsbesluite te kan neem.
Opsommend kan dus gestel word dat die kontrole matrikse wat
ontwikkel is, doeltreffend toegepas is om die geTdentifiseerde SAP
R/3 omgewing te evalueer.
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SYNOPSIS
The management and control of modern day computer systems are
becoming more and more trying due to the complexity of systems.
This renders the traditional approach to evaluating controls in
complex computer systems, inadequate and heightens the need for
an alternative audit approach.
The complex SAP R/3 environment will be evaluated in terms of
security and validity of users and processes. This will be achieved
through the use of an alternative audit approach namely, the
application of the Access Path and Path Context Models (Boshoff
1985, 1990).
The research methodology used during this research may indicate
universal application implications for similar complex environments,
although this has not yet been proved.
The research showed that there are many control features available
in the different software components of the SAP R/3 environment,
.
that can be applied to control access and validity of users and
processes. The duplication of control features provided by the
software components, requires a global approach to security inthe
defined environment. Only when evaluating the environment as a
whole, will it be able to make the most effective security decisions.
The use of the control matrices developed during this research will
ease the global evaluation of the SAP R/3 environment. Although
further research is required, the above has proven the usefulness of
both the research methodology and the resultant model and
matrices.
viii
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In conclusion, the applicability of the, Access Path and Path Context
Models (Boshoff 1985, 1990) to the predefined SAP R/3 environment
has been established.
ix
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.' 1.1 BACKGROUND
The electronic information transfer and processing era
brings new opportunities and challenges. The growing
reliance on information technology creates new risks that
both external and internal auditors must be prepared to
evaluate. Systems are becoming highly integrated and
information and operational processes are merging, thus
\ demanding of auditors to function in new ways. It is
imperative that auditors align their services with the needs
of the information driven business.
The nature of controls are changing. Controls are built into
processes and are becoming an integral and inseparable part
of each process. Because of the speed and extent of
information exchange, the effectiveness of detective
controls to manage risks is diminishing. More emphasis is to
be placed on preventative controls. This causes that the
effect following the occurrence of an exposure is difficult to
counter, thus magnifying the consequence of an exposure.
Management is forced by complex information systems and
information processing to apply new techniques and
alternate models to aid them in controlling the risks and
exposures brought on by the advanced technologies. This
has a direct impact on the auditors role and function.
1.2 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Rapid growth in technology has introduced exposures that
require the application of new controls to achieve effective
2
\system safeguards. External and internal auditors have to
deal with complex integrated application systems and the
demand for increased security.
The nature of integrated systems and related architectural
platforms renders the traditional approach to security
techniques and the sole reliance on security packages as
ineffective. A logical means to counter the above problem
is to apply technology to control technology.
A model to evaluate and monitor computer security in a
variety of complex environments, namely the Access Path
and Path Context Model (PCM), resulted from research done
by Boshoff (1985,1990). The model is based on a holistic
approach to computer security that successfully facilitates
the integration of organisational administrative principles
and computer security principles.
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THIS RESEARCH
As the Path Context'Model has been widely accepted, both
nationally and internationally, the credibility of the model is
certain and the proof there of it, not the purpose of this
essay.
The main reasons for presenting this essay are:
a) The known imperfection and inapplicability of
traditional computer security and security packages
in a complex data processing environment;
3
;, b) The limited published material that deals with security
in a SAP R/3 environment;
c) The applicability of the Context Path Model
(Boshoff, 1990) and the Access Model (Boshoff, 1985)
to validity in a SAP R/3 environment;
d) Evaluation of separate security issues in the key'
components of a SAP R/3 environment; and
. e) Augmentation of the holistic approach to security and
the correlation between judgement and acceptable
security risk.
1.4 SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS
1.4.1 Predefined Environment and Exclusions
The essay is based on an accumulation of data collected by
the author during further studies towards a Masters degree
and also knowledge gained in an actual SAP R/3
environment. The Telkom SA SAP R/3 environment studied
by the author consisted of the following:
a) SAP R/3 Module: Human Resource
b) Operating System: UNIX
c) Local Area Network : LAN
d) Database Management System: Oracle
4
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For this essay the predefined environment to which the
Access Path Model (Boshoff, 1985) was applied, was
similar to that of the studied Telkom SA environment, but
excluding Wide Area Networks.
1.4.2 Control Objectives and Exclusions
The definition of and association between general (integrity)
and user (application) controls, have been dealt with
extensively in various texts including Davis et al (1983:7),
Stettler et al (1997:524), AICPA (1984:6; 1977:25-62),
Halper et al (1985:16.8-16.11), CICA (1973:2), Boshoff
(1985:15) and IFAC (1985:9-12). To recapitulate this would
serve no useful purpose.
The below mentioned control objectives are an
amalgamation of the above mentioned authors and
objectives suggested by Boshoff (1985,1990) and is
presumed correct for this research essay. These control
objectives are:
a) COMPLETEN'ESS of input, processing, updating of
files and output;
b) ACCURACY of input, processing, updating of files
and output;
c) VALJDITY and authorization of business activities;
and
d) MAINTENANCE - ensuring operation and continuity of
5
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operations in accordance with business practice and
management expectations.
According to Boshoff (1985) the control objectives
remain unaffected by the uniqueness of the
environment. The appropriateness of the control
objectives for this research is based on the above.
Although the research published by Boshoff
(1985,1990) deals with the control objectives
completeness, accuracy, validity and maintenance,
this essay will be limited to validity only.
It is thus important to define validity (figure 1.1) as
follows:
Figure 1.1
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"1.4.3 Limitations and Exclusions
Apart from the exclusions already mentioned namely:
a} the application of user controls to secure the
predefined environment;
a} controls other than those that influences validity
the following limitations and exclusions are also applicable
to this research essay namely:
a} Although specific versions of the Operating system
software and the Database software in the Telkom
SA environment were studied, it has no bearing on
the rationale applied.
b) General issues such as security policy, administration
of security and physical security that impacts on the
total security of an environment.
c) Security packages as a means to ensure validity of
business processing.
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The 'research methodology adopted is merely used to
establish an operational framework within which facts are
placed so that their meaning may be seen more clearly
(Leedy, 1985). The research methodology chosen is
governed by the nature of the data to be studied.
7
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A predefined SAP(R3) environment in its entirety has not
previously been the subject of an investigation, thus limiting
the historical data on this subject.
The use of an extensive Iitery survey as a basis for the
research methodology is because of the limited data not
feasible. The litery survey consequently will be limited to
publications of Boshoff (1985, 1990), dealing with the
Access Path and Control Models and also to the manuals of .
the software in the predefined SAP R/3 environment.
1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH
The applicability of the Access Path and Path Control Model
(Boshoff 1985,1990) to a complex environment such as
SAP R/3 has been previously demonstrated.
The model will be applied respectively to the operating
system (UNIX), the network system (NOVELL NETWARE),
the database management system (ORACLE) and the SAP
R/3 software, to develop a conceptual framework. This will
be dealt with in ch~pter two.
Once the framework has been established a detailed
analysis of the key components affecting the validity control
objective will be conducted to refine and finalise the SAP
R/3 framework.
To this end, a matrix will be drawn up to identify the key
components and to describe the function or relevancy
(vertical axis) and the importance or relevancy of the
8
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individual components regarding the validity control
objective (horizontal axis).
To do this, each component will be evaluated to determine
the materiality of the component. As a result a numerical
value will be assigned to each component, reflecting its
ranking according to the following scale:
1 = Very Important
2 = Important
3 = Optional
This will be dealt with in Chapter three whilst Chapter four
will conclude with a summary on security in a predefined
SAP R/3 environment. The conclusion will reflect on the
applicability of the Access Path and Path Context Model
(Boshoff 1985,1990) to achieve the objective of validity of
business processing in a SAP R/3 environment.
The above described research approach is depicted in figure
1.2 .
9
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FigLire 1.2
1.7 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The SAP R/3 matrix that has been developed through the
application of the Access Path and Path Context Model
(Boshoff 1985, 1990), can be used to evaluate access
control in the predefined environment as part of the
evaluation of internal accounting controls. The use of the
matrix as an evaluation tool is not only limited to that of
external and internal auditors, but can be used as a
checklist by management to determine the quality of
10
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security implemented by them. Management will be able to
determine if the access control implemented in their SAP
R/3 environment meets their expectation of security as
specified in the security policy.
Although the matrix has been successfully applied in
evaluating access control in the predefined environment, the
universal applicability of the matrix has not been proven. It
can however be considered as a starting point for further··
research into other environments or into other aspects of
the predefined environment ( for example the use of the
Access Path and Path Context Model to evaluate other
control objectives such as completeness, accuracy and
maintenance) .
11
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the increased reliance on computer systems and
data, security has become rudimentary to the existence of
any organisation (SAC, 9:1). The value of data is influenced
by:
• the strategic importance of the data;
• reliance on data for decision making;
• the confidentiality of it; and
• third party and external requirements.
Increased reliance on data, demanded expanded system
capabilities and this in turn influenced the risk regarding
integrity, confidentiality and availability of data. In addition,
widely publicised fraud occurrences heightened the need for
improved software security.
2.2 BACKGROUND
SAP R/3 is currently the world wide leader in client server
.
applications and the biggest software supplier of
accounting, distribution and human resource applications.
This integrated application software product is developed
and distributed by the fifth biggest software provider in the
world.
The fifty two companies in South Africa that utilise SAP
products, make SAP one of the largest application vendors
in South-Africa. The local market share, based on new
sales, increased from 33% in 1993 to 45% in 1994.
13
:' SAP products are proven to be successful in a wide variety
of business sectors such as mining, education, retail etc.
The client size consists of 45% large companies, 40% small
companies and 15% medium companies. Caltex, Nissan,
Telkom and Gencor are just a few of the South-African
companies that utilise SAP.
The above demonstrates the relevancy and necessity of
further research into the security and controls of a SAP R/3
environment.
2.3 OBJECTIVES
This chapter will be used to establish the groundwork for
the development of a framework through the application of
the Path Context Model to the SAP R/3 environment. The
model will be used to define the environment and the
individual software components thereof.
The objective is thus effectively to develop a system of
procedures and controls that can be applied to restrict
access and ensure validity of users and processes in a SAP
R/3 environment.
2.4 LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS
The limitations and exclusions were discussed in Chapter 1.
The following exclusions are relevant to this chapter:
a) General issues such as security policies,
administration of security and physical security that
impact om the totoal security of the SAP R/3
environment.
14
b) Security packages as a means to ensure validity of
users and business processing
\.
c) The versions of the different software components in
the predefined SAP R/3 environment are deemed not
to influence the rationale applied.
2.5 GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY
The SAP R/3 application in an organisation does not
function in isolation and therefore the security cannot be
considered in isolation. The general organisational
framework for security will have a direct impact on SAP R/3
security.
It is the responsibility of management to establish,
communicate and control policies and procedures
(SAC, 9: 1). Management has the responsibility to ensure
that:
• exposures regarding security are assessed;'
• an organisational policy is established; and
• a compliance structure is implemented for:
- determining of control objectives;
choosing controls to achieve objectives; and
monitoring the application of it.
15
\;. 2.5.1 Establishment of an organisational policy
An organisation wide security policy is crucial for
establishing a framework for the development of security
procedures (SAC, 9:1). This will specify the security
strategy, objectives, how they will be achieved and
respective responsibilities. Security can be considered an
iterative process requiring periodic re-evaluation and
recommitment.
The risk associated with technology and automation must
be understood and controlled in a cost effective manner. In
other words a balance should be struck between protection
and production.
With the technical capabilities of today's hardware devices,
it is often tempting to rely on technical solutions only, when
it comes to security. The technical solutions are rarely
complete and should rather be used together with the
nontechnical decisions such as security objectives and
policies.
2.5.2 Implementing the Security policy
This section will deal with the framework for the technical
or computer environment. The Access Path that will be
applied by users to the SAP R/3 environment, will be
depicted and the details regarding the individual
components, will be explained.
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2.5.3 Choosing Controls
The software parameters and features as documented in the
control model will be matched to the validity control
objective and resultant control matrices will be drawn up.
2.6 ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK IN A SAP R/3
ENVIRONMENT
2.6.1 Introduction
Although the user in a SAP R/3 environment, perceives to
have direct access to data, this is not the case.
This is depicted as follows (figure2.1):
11I~1I1111111111~\
/~ ~\
V TnmsparantSoftwareLayers
Figure 2.1
17
The SAP R/3 user will pass through several layers of
software, transparent to him, before gaining access to the
data. The different layers of software that the user will pass
through before reaching the data he requested, will be
referred to as the SAP R/3 Access Path.
Each software layer in a SAP R/3 environment has different
features, functions and controls built into it. This means
that each software component should be considered when
evaluating the security risks and controls faced by the
organisation using SAP R/3 applications.
The components of the SAP R/3 model will be discussed in
the remainder of this chapter. Specific reference will be
made to the definitions and functions. Chapter 3 will cover
the software components in more detail.
2.6.2 Telecommunications
The telecommunications layer is the first layer of system
software encountered in the SAP R/3 access path.
A network requires at .least two microcomputers, one of
which (server) must have a hard disk. The server controls
activities such as monitoring network access, controlling
printer queues, receiving and forwarding of messages and
directing of electronic mail messages.
For this essay and according to the scope and predefined
environment (Chapter 1), the telecommunications software
in the predefined SAP R/3 environment is NOVELL
NETWARE.
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NOVELL is used to connect several devices in a limited
geographical area. (Day, Chapter 1) It allows users to share
common peripheral devices, such as hard disks and printers,
computer software and data.
This concept is depicted in figure 2.2
__1_----'
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Software
0
[ JData
Figure 2.2
The first level of control can be applied at the
telecommunications software layer by giving users access
to peripheral devices, software and data, based on their job
requirements.
19
;, 2.6.3 Application software
Although there are other layers between the communication
software and the application software, these are not within
the scope of this essay.
This concept is depicted in figure 2.3
o
[~ J
Q
~
~
C DMa J
Figure 2.3
SAP R/3 application software is designed around a three-tier
client-server model. At the client level is what SAP refers to
as the presentation layer. This can be a combination of SAP
developed application modules and popular third-party
applications such as Microsoft Office. The middle layer is
the application layer and the hub of R/3's activities. Here all
20
the application modules reside. This layer of middleware is
built using the ABAP/4 GL programming language.
Several security opportunities exists within the SAP R/3
application software. The linking of users to specific
transactions, controlling access with user id's and
passwords and the linking of sensitive transactions to
specific terminals are just a few of the possibilities.
2.6.4 Data access method
This is the last layer before the data is accessed. The
Relational Database Management System in the predefined
SAP R/3 environment, acts as an interface between the
physical storage and logical presentation of the data and
provides a set of tools for handling data (Perry,
1989:Chapter 1).
Apart from the storage and retrieval of data the tools can be
used to:
• define the database:
• query the database;
• add, edit and delete data;
• modify the structure of the database;
• secure data from public access;
• ·communicate within the network; and
• export and import data.
This concept is depicted in figure 2.4 as follows:
21
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Figure 2.4
The database query language, SOL, is the core of the
database, consisting of structured statements and
commands to store and access data stored in the database.
The database management system used in the predefined
SAP R/3 environment is ORACLE.
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Figure 2.5
2.6.5 Operating system
The operating system is important not only because it
controls the computer's input and output processes as well
as loads and runs other programs, but also because it is a
set of mechanisms and policies that help to define
controlled sharing of system resources. (Garfinkel, 1993:
Chapter 1).
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Standard utilities such as copying of files and listing the
contents of directories, although not technically part of the
operating system, should also be considered because of
their impact on the total security.
The operating system in the predefined SAP R/3
environment is UNIX.
2.7 CONCLUSION
The relevancy of research of the security features and
controls within a SAP R/3 environment, was established.
The ground work for the development of a framework,
through the application of the Path Context Model (Boshoff,
1990), to the predefined environment, was completed.
It was clear that the different software layers, provide
several opportunities, to control the validity of users and
processing. The combination of the different opportunities,
will mostly likely provide adequate security and validity
controls.
The SAP R/3 access path as depicted in figure 2.5, shows
the different software components, that will be reviewed in
detail. The components that have a material impact on the
security and validity of the predefined environment, will be
identified and evaluated.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
The task of identifying potential risks and controls in a complex
environment such as the SAP R/3 environment, is a very involved
and difficult task. This can be simplified through the application of
the Path Context and Access Path Models (Boshof 1985, 1990) to
the said environment. The result of such an application to the
environment, will be diagrams or matrices of the different software
layers and their respective relationships.
The diagrammatic depiction of the software layers will aid in
identifying the risk and control features of each of the individual
software layers. Only when the software layers, their relationship
and their features are understood, can a decision be made regarding
the controls to be implemented in the SAP R/3 environment as a
whole.
The software components as identified in the predefined SAP R/3
environment will be dealt with below. Control features and options
intluencinq the validity of users and processing, as the focus point
of this essay, will also be reviewed.
This chapter will not describe the detailed workings of the different
software components but will focus on the control features and
parameters that affect the validity of users and processing. Only a
brief description will be given of the software components, as it is
assumed that the reader has a working knowledge thereof.
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3.2 NOVELL NETWARE
3.2.1 Introduction
NOVELL NETWARE (Lawrence B, 1990:197) controls access to
servers and files in four ways namely:
• login control;
• user rights;
• directory rights; and
• file attribute control.
3.2.2 Login names and passwords
The login name (Lawrence, 1990:Chapter 1) given to a user allows
him to login and attach commands in order to gain access to the file
server.
There are different categories of users (Lawrence, 1990: 198)
namely:
• the server supervisor has unlimited access to the server files
and directories;
• the workgroup supervisor controls a particular list of users and
can add new users; and
• normal users have only access privileges assigned to them by
a supervisor or workgroup manager.
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A user login is added by way of SYSCON (Lawrence, 1990: 198).
Login names can be up to forty-seven characters long and cannot
contain spaces. Passwords can be used to secure login names but is
an optional facility and not enforced by NOVELL NETWARE.
The network supervisor controls how a user is allowed to login
(Lawrence, 1990:204-211) by implementing certain restrictions such
as:
\
• allowing users to change their own passwords;
• specifying the minimum password length;
• forcing the periodic change of passwords;
• setting the number of days between password changes;
• specifying the date that a password expires;
• limiting the g~ace logins that control the number of times a
user can log in with an expired password; and
• requiring the use of unique passwords.
Once a user has a login name and password, he or she has to be set
up with an account that specifies the profile of that user (Lawrence,
1990:208-211). The network supervisor can control four aspects of
a user account namely:
• enabling or disabling the account;
• controlling the password usage;
28
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• controlling the concurrent connections; and
• limiting the disk space that a user can have for the storage of
files.
Other restrictions (Lawrence, 1990:212-215) that could be used to
control user access are:
• Station restrictions. Used to limit the use of a login name to a
particular PC or group of PC's.
• Time restrictions. Used to designate blocks of time during
which users can log in.
Because of the number of users on a network, assigning users to a
group, eases the administration load of assigning rights to individual
users (Lawrence, 1990:217-223). The proper use of groups is
essential to the efficient management of NOVELL NETWARE securltv.
,
NOVELL NETWARE grants user and group privileges by means of
trustee assignments, which defines the rights that a group has
regarding a file or server directory. The user inherits rights that apply
to the user in the parent directory, unless specified otherwise. Rights
assigned to a directory apply to all sub-directories of that directory.
3.2.3 NOVELL NETWARE Rights
The eight NOVELL NETWARE dlrectorv (Lawrence, 1990:230-233)
rights are:
• READ enables a directory trustee to read the contents of
existing files;
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• WRITE enables a directory trustee to change or add to the
contents of existing files;
• OPEN enables a user to open an existing file;
• CREATE enables a user to create a new file in the directory;
• DELETE enables a user to erase an existing file in the
directory;
• PARENTAL enables a user to give other users, rights to a
directory and to modify the directory's rights mask;
• SEARCH enables the user to list the SCAN files in the
directory; and
• MODIFY enables a user to rename a file or sub-directory or
change the attributes of a file or sub-directory.
NOVELL NETWARE 386 gives the further capability to give and
withhold the above eight rights to individual files (Lawrence,
1990:235). It is lrnportant'to note that:
• file rights always take precedence over directory rights; and
• users automatically get the same rights to a directory's files as
they have to the directory itself, unless you specifically give
or withhold certain file rights.
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3.2.4 Managing Files
File control is used to give varying levels of access to the files in a
particular database (Lawrence, 1990:665). This is done by assigning
certain attributes to files such as:
• READ ONLY means that you cannot write to a file, change or
delete it even though you have the trustee rights to do so.
• HIDDEN makes a file invisible to programs that try to list, copy
or delete the file.
• SYSTEM is used for files created when you make a DOS disk
bootable.
• ARCHIVE is turned on automatically when a file has been
changed by a program or a DOS command.
• SHAREABLE files can be accessed by more than one user at
a time.
• INDEXED makes the access to very large files more efficient.
• EXECUTE ONLY prevents files from being copied.
• TRANSACTIONAL works in conjunction with the transaction
tracking system.
• COPY INHIBIT is designed to prevent Macintosh users from
copying.
• DELETE INHIBITprevents users with ERASE rights to delete a
file.
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• PURGE retains a deleted file so that it can be salvaged if
necessary.
• RENAME INHIBIT prevents a file from being renamed even if
the user has MODIFY rights.
• READ AUDIT provides an audit trail listing of users who have
read the file.
• WRITE AUDIT provides an audit trail listing of users who have
written to a file.
3.3 SAP R/3
As the published information on SAP R/3 is very limited and the
manuals are still in the process of being translated from German to
English, the literature survey was limited to the SAP R/3 Training
Manual.
The SAP R/3 application makes use of an authorization concept that
has a hierarchical structure consisting of the following components:
• Profile;
• Authorization Object (with corresponding fields); and
• Authorizations (with corresponding activities).
A profile contains a list of authorizations and reflects the description
of the workplace. Authorization objects refer to one or more SAP R/3
system elements to be protected and may list up to ten fields.
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Authorization fields represents an element of the SAP R/3 system eg.
company code 0001, or any activity to be protected ego display,
change, delete etc.
The authorization components (SAP Authorization Concepts. 1) can
be depicted as follows (Fig 3.1):
I USER MAS1'ER RECORD I
I
I PROFILE I
I
I I
AUTHORIZATIoN AUTHORIZATIONS
OBJECTS
I ;
I
I FIELDS I VALUES I ~CfIVJTIES I
.
Figure 3.1
SAP R/3 performs an authority check against the user master record
and this is performed using a check routine. The authorization check
is carried out with AND logic for authorizations in programs.
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The SAP R/3 authorization concept introduces a version concept for
maintenance to ensure that:
• an active version is in effect in the system; and
• an updated version is maintained.
The above version concept applies to both profiles and
authorizations. If one creates or edits authorizations and profiles, you
are working with an updated version that is activated by a separate
transaction. The active version is used for authorization checks.
The authorization concept makes use of complex objects that allows
the definition of extremely varied authorizations.
SAP R/3 requires the implementation of segregation of maintenance
responsibilities, as a control measure, which implies the following:
• An authorization administrator that maintains authorizations
and/or profiles and composite profiles.
• An activation administrator that activates authorizations
and/or profiles and composite profiles.
• A user administrator that maintains the user master records.
SAP R/3 uses a user's authorization tree to define two types of
profiles namely:
• Simple profile, or single level list authorizations, and
• Composite profiles that contain other profiles.
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Changes to a profile become effective for all users who have that
profile.
Authorization objects are combined to form classes. By way of menu
options one can select a class and the system will display all the
objects pertaining to that class.
SAP R/3 allows the tracking of changes (SAP Authorization Concept:
Chapter 2). The user management system contains an evaluation
system for changed documents, and tracks the following:
• changes to user's authorizations;
• changes to passwords, user type, user group, area of validity
and account ID for a particular user;
• changes to profiles (activation); and
• changes to authorizations (activation).
SAP R/3 provides an information system that allows one to retrieve
information on users, profiles, authorizations and objects.
3.4 ORACLE
3.4.1 Introduction
ORACLE provides two mechanisms for database security (Perry,
1989:350).
a) The authentication subsystem requires the user to supply a
username and password.
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b) The authorization subsystem assigns system and object-level
rights, and specifies the activities that users are allowed.
The powerful view mechanism provided by ORACLE is part of the
authorization subsystem. The authentication mechanism allows the
user to log on to the database while the authorization mechanism
allows the user to share database objects and allows the database
administrator to assign system-wide privileges.
3.4.2 Authentication Subsystem
The authentication subsystem requires a valid username and
associated password to log on to ORACLE and to access ORACLE via
SOL*PLUS, SOL*FORMS, SOL* ReportWriter, SOL*Calc, SOL*menu,
or ORACLE for 123. Once a user has been successfully
authenticated, the authorization subsystem provides further database
object protection.
ORACLE provides a predefined username and password that can be
used to log on to SOL*PLUS for the first time. The username is
displayed but the password not. ORACLE provides the facility for
each user to change his own password and allows a password to be
from one to thirty characters long.
The superuser password SYSTEM has database administrator
privileges and allows a user with those privileges to alter virtually any
table in the entire system (Perry, 1989:353).
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3.4.3 Authorization Subsystem
The authorization subsystem allows the database administrator to
grant and revoke privileges to users via the SOL statements, GRANT
and REVOKE (Perry, 1989:357-391). ORACLE maintains two levels
of privileges:
• System privileges. Determines whether a user can log on to
ORACLE, create objects and authorize other users to log on to
ORACLE. This refers to the CONNECT, RESOURCE and DBA
privileges.
• Object privileges. Provides detailed control over database
objects (tables, views etc.). Object privileges allow the control
of table access down to the level of specific columns of
selected rows of a particular table.
3.4.3.1 Establishing system privileges
The ORACLE database administrator assigns usernames and
passwords that are known as enrolling users. Once enrolled a user
.
is restricted to one of the three system privileges, namely CONNECT,
RESOURCE and DBA.
Users with CONNECT privilege can:
•
•
•
log o~ to ORACLE;
create views and synonyms;
retrieve data from other users' tables and views to which they
have been granted access; and
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"• perform INSERT, DELETE and UPDATE operations on other
users' tables and views to which they have been granted the
appropriate access.
They can however not create tables, indexes or clusters of their
own.
Users with CONNECT and RESOURCE privileges have all of the above
abilities and also the following:
• Use of the AUDIT command to control auditing of object
access to objects that they own.
• Creating of database tables, indexes and clusters.
• Granting and revoking of object privileges on objects they
own.
Users with DBA privileges can in addition to the above:
• perform full database export and import operations;
• access and perform any SOL statement and on any other
users' data;
• grant and revoke users' system level privileges;
• create public synonyms; .
• create and alter partitions; and
• control auditing and table-level auditing defaults on the entire
ORACLE system.
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System level privileges can be selectively removed for one or more
usernames with the REVOKE statement.
3.4.3.2 Establishing Object Privileges
Once users have been given CONNECT, RESOURCE and DBA
privileges, they can be granted object access privileges to insert,
update, delete or retrieve data that they have not created, as users
have all privileges on tables or views that they have created (Perry,
1989:360-371 ).
Object-level privileges protect each database table and view
maintained by ORACLE. There are seven object-level privileges,
namely ALL, SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, ALTER and INDEX.
Any of the above privileges can be granted on a table for use by one
or many users through the use of PUBLIC, which allows the entire
database population to access the specified table.
The privileges that can be granted on views are SELECT, INSERT,
.
UPDATE and DELETE. The privilege UPDATE, offers the finest degree
of control as access can be restricted to particular columns.
Users can be granted the right to pass their granted access privileges
on to other users but users cannot pass on rights to others' tables
that they did not explicitly receive themselves.
The data dictionary view SYSTABAUTH contains all object-level grant
information about all the objects protected by ORACLE. This is useful
when wanting to list object access privileges.
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3.4.3.3 Restricting access to selected columns and rows
\.
A view can be defined that provides only a subset of the table's
columns (Perry, 1989:371-376). A table can be protected from
unwanted disclosure or alteration on a column-by-column basis.
By defining views that return only selected rows of tables, you can
prevent access to entire rows of information.
One can also create views to simplify data retrieval and hide data ego
derived data or columns where values are computed by expressions.
3.4.3.4 Auditing
This allows the recording of security related events and are
controlled and maintained by dictionary tables and views (Perry,
1989:377-384). ORACLE provides a set of auditing commands and
associated tables and views in which to store audit information.
Before any audit data can be collected, the entire audit mechanism
must be enabled by INIT;ORA. The database administrator must
specify which actions should be audited and in addition can choose
to audit any users' tables or views.
3.5 UNIX
3.5.1 Introduction
There are many different versions of UNIX available and every
supplier of UNIX has made its own changes to the operating system
(Garfinkel, 1993: Chapter 1). These changes have significant security
implications that are not always considered by the vendors before
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making the changes. It is not the purpose of this essay to note
differences between the different versions of UNIX but to cover it in
general. The focus will however be on UNIX System V and Berkeley
UNIX as this covers most of the UNIX machines in use.
3.5.2 Technical Description
UNIX is a multi-user, rnulti-taskinp operating system. Multi-user
implies that the operating system allows many different users to use
the same computer simultaneously. Multi-tasking implies that each
user can run many different programs simultaneously (Garfinkel,
1993: Chapter 1).
UNIX can be divided into three parts:
• The Kernel. Controls all input and output systems, allows the
simultaneous running of multiple programs and allocates
system time and memory among the multiple programs.
• Standard utility programs. The utility programs vary in size.
.
The smaller utilities can serve single functions such as /binlls
that list files and /bin/cp that copy them. The larger utilities
such as /bin/shw, the UNIX shell that process user commands,
are programming languages.
• System database files. Although small, they are used by a
variety of programs, such-as /etc/group that describes groups
of users with similar access rights.
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UNIX has sophisticated security features that control file access,
system resources and modifications to the database. Many problems
have been experienced with security in the past but most resulted
because of flaws in individual programs or their interaction. Because
of its design, a single flaw in the operating system can compromise
the security of the system as a whole.
3.5.3 Users and Passwords
User and password security is the first line of defense. Once an
attacker gains access to the system he or she is free to browse
around and exploit the system (Garfinkel, 1993: Chapter 2).
3.5.3.1 Usernames
Every UNIX user has an account that consists of two parts namely
the username that is the identifier and the password that is the
authenticator (Garfinkel, 1993: Chapter 2). A user can have more
than one account with its own unique username. Usernames are
between one and eight characters long.
3.5.3.2 Passwords
Once the user has been identified by a username the user has to be
authenticated by way of a password (Garfinkel, 1993: Chapter 2).
If either, the.password or username does not match, UNIX does not
log the user in. UNIX does not display the password when the user
types it in. If an invalid password is typed in several times in
succession, the account will be locked. A locked account can only
be unlocked by the system administrator. UNIX also allows you to
change your password with the passwd(1) command.
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UNIX does not control the construction of a password effectively ego
if a user chooses a password consisting of fewer than six characters,
UNIX will request a longer password, but will accept a shorter
password after three attempts. Users can be prevented to choose
their own passwords through the UNIX password generator facility.
A lifetime for passwords can also be set by the systems
administrator. Users with an expired password are then forced to
change their passwords. If the password is exceptionally old, UNIX
will prevent the user from logging in.
3.5.3.3 Encrypted Passwords
UNIX stores a value, generated by using the password to encrypt a
block of zeros, with a function called crypt(3). The result of the
calculation is stored in the letc/passwd file (Garfinkel, 1993:29-31).
The security of this approach depends on the strength of the
encryption algorithm.
3.5.3.4 Users, Groups and Superusers
UNIX represents each user, (Garfinkel, 1993:46-56) by a single
number called the user identifier (UID). Special UID's are used for
system users such as:
• root, the superuser that does accounting and low-level system
functions;
• uucp, that manages the UUCP system; and
• daemon, that handles the network aspects.
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\UID's are 16-bit numbers of which the translation between the
usernames and UID's is kept in the letc/passwd file.
All users are assigned to groups and the group identification numbers
are known as GID's. The primary group that a user belongs to is
stored in the letc/passwd file. Groups are handled differently by
different versions of UNIX.
Apart from the regular users, a number of special users exist for
administrative reasons. The most important of these is the superuser
with a UID of '0' and password of 'root'. This root account is used
to perform basic system functions such as logging users in and out,
recording accounting information and managing input and output
devices. The above implies that the administrator has complete
control over the system and is able to turn off all security checks. It
is thus vital to prevent unauthorised users from obtaining superuser
rights.
3.5.3.5 The UNIX Filesystem
The UNIX filesystem is the "basic tool for enforcing security because
it controls which users can access what and how (Garfinkel,
1993:57-69). UNIX stores security information such as UID's, GID's
and file permissions for each file. File permissions indicate what
access (read, write, execute) is granted to users.
UNIX uses ordinary files to store the contents of directories.
Directories like other files have attributes such as owner, group and
permission bits.
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3.5.3.6 UNIX Log Files
UNIX maintains files that log when users log in and keeps track of
what commands they run (Garfinkel, 1993:126-135). This forms the
basis of the UNIX auditing facilities as it helps in discovering
unauthorised use. The following are the most important logs:
• lusr/admllastlog logs each user's most recent login time;
• letc/utrnp logs a record each time a user logs in;
• lusrlsdm/wtmp logs a record each time a user logs in or out;
and
• lusr/adm/acct logs every command run by every user.
3.6 CONCLUSION
The key features and controls of each software layer that influences
validity of users and pro'cessing, have been documented. This
background information will be used to develop the matrices in
Chapter 4.
Evidently most of the identified features are duplicated in the
different software layers. The importance of understanding the
features and the interaction of the different software layers, is thus
heightened by the replica of control features. Only once this has
been achieved, can decisions be made regarding the validity of users
and processing in the global SAP R/3 environment.
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The application of the Access path and Path Context Models to the
different software layers in the SAP R/3 environment, will facilitate
the detail analysis of the identified features, thus ensuring an
adequate evaluation of validity in the predefined environment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will depict the SAP R/3 model, as defined in the
previous chapters, by way of matrices. These matrices will contain
the validity features and components of the software components
in the predefined SAP R/3 environment.
The matrices will provide a view of the technical components to
be used to achieve the validity control objective. This will support
the Access Path Model (Boshof, 19901 concept of using technology
to control technology.
2. THE MATRICES
An individual matrix will be developed for the telecommunication
software, application software, data access software and the
operating system.
.
The matrices will only depict features or components that
influence validity of users and processing. In other words, the
features that impress the privacy and confidentiality of the SAP
R/3 business processes will be depicted.
The first column will identify the feature or component that
impacts the validity of the SAP R/3 environment, while the second
column will refer to the materiality value allocated to each
component.
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\The materiality value will be assigned to each component on the
following basis:
1 Very important
2 Important
3 Optional
The matrices can be used as a reference by the implementors of
the different components when selecting possible control options
to implement. This will ensure the validity of a SAP R/3
application.
3. NOVEll NETWARE MATRIX
The following features and controls are available (Heywood,
1991); (Lawrence, 1990);
SYSCON 1
Used as primary tool to manage fi Ie server security
and configurati on Used to view and chan ge
passwords or access rights
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FILE AND DIRECTORY ATTRIBUTES
1. READ ONLY 1
Means that you cannot write to a file, change or
delete it even though you have the trustee rights to
do so. This flag is especially appropriate for program
files.
2. WRITE ONLY 1
Enables user to modify, delete or rename files if the
user has the appropriate rights.
3. HIDDEN 1
Makes a file invisible to p!ograms that try to list,
copy or delete files.
4. EXECUTE ONLY 1
Prevents EXE or .COM files from being copied or
backed-up. This flag cannot be removed. The file
must be deleted and restored from program disks.
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5. DELETE INHIBIT 1
Prevents users from deleting the flagged directory or
files regardless of erase rights. The user must have
the modify rights to remove this flag.
USER GROUPS AND RIGHTS
1. ACCESS CONTROL 1
Grants the right to modify file or directory trustee
assignments and the DIR inherited right mask.
2. CREATE :2
Grants the right to create new files in the DIR either
with a program or by copying files into the DIR and
also to salvage a file after it has been deleted.
3. ERASE 1
Grants the right to delete files, subdirectories or the
directory itself.
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4. FILE SCAN 2
Grants the right to see files in the directory.
USER GROUPS AND RIGHTS
6. READ 2
Grants the right to open files and read the file
contents. The right is required to permit users to run
programs stored in the directory.
7. WRITE 1
Grants the right to open, -rnodifv and write to files.
8. SUPERVISORY 1
Grants all rights to the directory, its files and
subdirectories. Also grants all rights to individual
files. Circumvents all restrictions.
9. GRANTS 1
Grants trustee rights to a user or group. Options are:
• ALL: grants all rights except supervisor rights;
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• CREATE: enables users to create files but not
to write to them;
• ERASE: enables users to delete or erase files;
• MODIFY: enables users to modify file names
or attributes;
• ACCESS CONTROL: enables users or group to
control access to the directory;
• READ: enables the user to read from a file in
the directory;
• FILE SCAN: enables the user to see a file
name during a DOS directory command; and
• SUPERVISOR: gives all available rights to the
user.
ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
1. ACCOUNT DISABLED 2
For the account to be functional this option must be
set to 'no'. Useful when employee has gone on
extended leave.
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2. DATE ACCOUNT EXPIRES 2
Specify a date after which the account ceases to be
available. Useful for setting up temporary
employees.
3. LIMIT CONCURRENT CONNECTIONS 2
'Yes' restricts a user to the number of concurrent
connections as specified in the maximum connec-
tions parameter.
4. MAXIMUM CONNECTIONS ;2
If concurrent connections are limited, a connection
limit can be set of one or-more.
5. ALLOW USER TO CHANGE PASSWORD 2
'No' = centralised password maintenance. If set to
'no' the user is also unable to change the account
login script using SYSCON.
6. PASSWORD REQUIRED 1
Allows the installation to require passwords for
sensitive accounts.
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7. MINIMUM PASSWORD LENGTH 2
Allows installation to specify password syntax rules.
8. FORCE PERIODIC PASSWORD CHANGES 2
Allows installation to require passwords to be
changed regularly.
9. DAYS BETWEEN FORCE PASSWORD
CHANGES
2
Allows installation to specify maximum number of
days a user can keep a password.
10. LIMIT GRACE LOGIN
Allows installation to restrict users from logging in
indefinitely with an expired password
11. GRACE LOGINS ALLOWED
Indicates the number of times the user is allowed to
login with an expired password before the account is
locked.
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12. REMAINING GRACE LOGINS 2
Number is decreased when login with expired
password takes place.
13. REQUIRE UNIQUE PASSWORD
Allows installation to restrict users from reusing a
previous password until it has been changed several
times.
14. INTRUDER DETECTION LOCKOUT
Is designed to alert the network when someone tries
to lock into the system using an invalid password .
.
15. ALLOW ENCRYPTED PASSWORD
Allows installation to set whether to use
unencrypted passwords to access the network.
SUPERVISORY COMMANDS
2
;3
1
1 LOGIN 2
Access the named or default server and the file
server's resources and invokes the login script on
that particular server.
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2. PAUDIT 2
Displays the systems accounting records including
login time, logout time, service charges and intruder
detection information.
3. SYSCON 2
Used to control accounting, file server, group and
user information.
4. REMOVE :2
Deletes users and groups from files and directory
trustee list.
5. REMOVE DOS 2
Removes DOS completely from file server,
eliminating 'access to DOS.
6. SECURE CONSOl 2
Removes DOS from the file server and prevents the
use of DOS debugger. limits the loading of NlMs
from only the SYS:SYSTEM DIR.
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4. SAP R/3 MATRIX
The following features are available(SAP Authorization Concepts):
1 AUTHORITY CHECK 2
Authority check against the user master record
Check is carried out with AND logic for
authorizations in programs.
2. /NSU01 3
Used to create a master record by copying an
existing master record and modifying it. Can also
copy user defaults, address and parameter settings
3. login/min_password_Ing 2
Used to change the minimum length of the password
by changing the system settings.
4. login/password_expiration_time 2
Used to set the number of days after which a
password must be changed.
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5. login/fails_to_session_end 2
Sets the number of times a user can enter an
incorrect password before the system ends the logon
attempt. Default value is 3, but it can be set to any
value between 1 and 99.
6. login/fails_to_user_lock 2
Sets the number of times a user can enter an
incorrect password before the system locks the user
against further logon attempts. Default value is 12,
but it can be set to any value between 1 and 99.
7. 5_USER ALL, 5AP NEW
Profiles assigned to the system administrator.
.
System administrator can create user master records
with all possible authorizations.
1
8. Transaction 5M31 2
Can define whether a table can be maintained online.
These tables contain system control data, basic data
of the business applications, and basic data
describing the structure of an enterprise.
Authorizations for displaying and maintaining tables
can be assigned selectively. Changing tables includes
adding, changing and deleting table entries.
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9. S SPO ACT 2
Can assign authorizations to spool requests. Specify
values in the SPOACTION and SPOAUTH fields for
this authorization object.
10. S SPO DEV
In order to use an output device, the user requires a
particular authorization For this purpose, object
S_SPO_DEV with field SPODEVICE is required.
11. S BTCH ADM
Background processing administration. User with this
authorization can:
• access background jobs in all of the clients of
an SAP system; and
• perform any operation on any background job
other than scheduling or displaying spool
requests generated by a job.
Each job must have a user ID (scheduling).
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12. 5 PROGRAM
Authorization to run an ABAP/4 program. Allows to
start a program, maintain attributes and text
elements and start and maintain variants.
13. 5 EDITOR
ABAP/4 editor authorization test. Allows to display
or change source.
14. 5 QUERY
Used to determine whether a user can create and
change queries and can maintain functional areas
and user groups which are essential for ABAP/4
queries.
15. 5 BDC MON
Batch input authorizations. When the system
processes a session, it checks the master record of
the user who started the session. Several sessions
can be started via the background controller.
Monitors the background processing, online
processing, release after system breakdown etc.
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16. S SCDO 2
Change documents This object authorizes a user to
access change documents Allows the following
actions:
• display and maintain change documents;
• delete change documents;
• display change documents; and
• maintain change document objects.
17. S ADMI FCD
The system uses this authorization to test access to
the transaction table. Gives permission to maintain
transaction tables.
18. S TSKH ADM
This authorization object is used to test access to
the transaction locking function.
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5. ORACLE MATRIX
The following control features are available (Kingsley, 1993);
(Perry, 1989):
AUDIT RELEVANT DATA DICTIONARY TABLES 2
1. AU DIT ACCESS
Audit entries for accesses to users' tables / views
2
2. AUDIT ACTIONS
Maps auditing action numbers to action names.
3. AUDIT CONNECT 2
Audit trail entries for user logon and logoff.
4. AUDIT DBA 1
Audit trail entries for DBA activities - for DBA use
only.
5. AUDIT-EXITS 2
Audit trail entries for objects which do NOT EXIST -
for DBA use only.
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6. AUDIT TRAIL 2
Audit trail entries relevant to the user - DBA sees all
7 . DEFAULT AUDIT
Default table auditing options. 3
8. SYSTEM AUDIT 2
System audltlnq options - for DBA use only.
9. TABLE AUDIT 2
Auditing options of users' tables and views.
SYSTEM AUDITING
1. INIT.ORA parameters AUDIT TRAIL = 'TRUE' . 1
Used to monitor security within the database. By
default auditing is dlsabled: To enable, set parameter
to 'TRUE' and restart database.
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2. AUDIT{[CONNECT][RESOURCE][DBA] 1
[NOT]EXITS]ALL}[WHENEVER[NOT]
SUCCESSFUL}
The SOL command AUDIT must be used to specify
events to be logged. The following options are
available:
• CONNECT: audits all connects and disconnects
from ORACLE.
• RESOURCE: audits all SOL commands that
create, alter or drop database objects.
• DBA: audits all use of the SOL commands
GRANT, REVOKE, AUDIT and NOAUDIT.
• NOT EXITS: audits all references to database
objects that do not exist.
OBJECT AUDITING
1 AUDIT ACTION ON OBJECnBY{SESSION
IACCESS}] [WHENEVER[NOT]SUCESSFUL}
Oracle allows the logging of specific actions which
affect database objects such as tables and views.
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The valid type of actions that can be audited are as
follows
• ALTER;
• INSERT;
• AUDIT;
• LOCK;
• COMMENT;
• RENAME;
\ • DELETE; and
• SELECT.
USER AUDITING AND MONITORING
1 SIGN-ON AUDIT 2
This feature provides the following capabilities:
• tracks what users are doing and when;
• chooses what to audit and what type of
information to audit;
• views on-line what users are doing;
• retrieves historical audit information;
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checks security of the application; and
• determines who changed data and when.
Auditing can be performed at three different levels
namely:
• user: records who signs on, time of log on and
off and terminals used;
• responsibility: responsibility the user selects is
tracked; and
• form: forms the user navigates to are tracked.
The command to monitor user activity on the system
is \NAVIGATE SECURITY MONITOR.
NOTIFYING OF UNSUCCESSFUL LOGINS
1. SIGN-ON NOTIFICATION = 'YES' 2
Notifying of unsuccessful logins can be activated
through the Set Personal Profiles form by setting the
mentioned parameter.
The user does not have to be audited by using the
Sign On Audit to use this feature.
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APPLICATION SECURITY
DEFINING AN APPLICATION USER (SOL *FORMS and
SOl*MENU)
1 \NAVIGATE SECURITY USER 1
This command defines a new application user,
assigns one or more responsibilities and a password
to be changed by user after initial sign on.
User can access ORACLE applications through
ORACLE applications Forms and Menus. The user is
defined by a user id and password.
The system restricts Admin from deleting an
application user as the information helps to retain an
audit trail. Users can be deactivated by setting END
DATE to current date.
The following fields are otlmportance to the auditor:
• user name: displayed by various screens and
windows;
• password: at least five characters long, must
be changed with first sign on. Admin can only
set first password, cannot access chosen
password;
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• start date: date user becomes active, defaults
to current date;
• end date: date user can no longer sign on, if
not specified user name is valid indefinitely;
and
• change password days: maximum days allowed
between password changes.
APPLICATION SECURITY
DEFINING AN APPLICATION USER
2. \NAVIGATE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY 2
Used to define a responsibility consisting of an
ORACLE 10, a main menu, and an initial form and
y
report security group.
Fields of importance are:
• application: name of the application to be
associated with responsibility;
• name: name of the responsibility;
• start date: date it becomes active; and
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• end date: date it is no longer active.
3. \NAVIGATE SECURITY GROUP REPORT 2
Used to register an ORACLE 10 with ORACLE
applications. This 10 is a username used to access
the ORACLE database.
The following fields are of importance:
USERNAME, PASSWORD and LOGICAL DATABASE
APPLICATION, which is the name of the application
that is associated with ORACLE ID's logical database,
PRIVILEGES - enter the type of privilege to the
ORACLE APPLICATION OBJECT LIBRARY database
tables that this ORACLE 10 needs.
y
The following privileges are available:
•
•
•
ENABLED: ID has full privileges (insert, query,
update and delete) to the Application Object
Library database tables;
RESTRICTED: 10 has only query privileges to
the Application Object Library and cannot use
Library features;
DISABLED: 10 has no privileges;
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• PUBLIC: ID allows all users to access 2
Application Sign on Security form where they
must enter a valid Application username and
password; and
• APPlSYS: installation process registers the
Application Object Library ORACLE ID with
APPlSYS privilege.
4. \NAVIGATE SECURITY GROUP TERMINAL 1
Groups of terminals can be defined to facilitate the
task of Security Administration.
5. \NAVIGATE SECURITY TERMINAL 1
Allows terminals to be assigned specific user
responsibilities. This authorises access to critical data
and transactions in the application. To assure a
secure responsibility, both the user and the terminal
must be authorised.
6. \NAVIGATE SECURITY MONITOR 2
Used to monitor what application users are currently
doing on the system.
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USER SECURITY
1 SPECIAL USERNAMES 1
\
Automatically creates two usernames in the Data
Dictionary when a database is created. They are for
system maintenance and database admin and are
created with the default passwords:
USERNAME PASSWORD
CHANGE ON INSTALL
MANAGER
SYS
SYSTEM
These default passwords should be changed
immediately after database creation to prevent
unauthorised access.
These passwords have powerful DBA privileges and
should be changed regularJv.
2. DATABASE CONNECTION
GRANT {CONNECT I[RESOURCE]DBA} TO
username IDENTIFIED by PASSWORD
2
Creates a new entry a Data Dictionary for the
database containing the new ORACLE username,
password and associated security information.
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3. AUTOMATIC LOGIN 2
GRANT CONNECT TO OPS$sysid IDENTIFIED
by PASSWORD
Links the operating system username to the ORACLE
username in order to facilitate the process of
connecting to a database.
4. DATABASE PRIVILEGES 1
There are three privileges which a user may be
granted Each provides a different level of general
access to the different objects contained in a
database.
CONNECT: this is the least powerful privilege
and allows the user only the following:
• connect to an ORACLE database; and
• access or modify data in database objects
belonging to other users, if appropriate access
has been granted by the owner of the object.
RESOURCE:: user who has RESOURCE privileges in
addition to CONNECT privileges will in addition be
able to create database objects such as tables.
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The user will be able to connect the security of the
objects he has created and will be able to enable or
disable the auditing access to objects. The power of
above can be limited by restricting the user to only
create objects in a specified tablespace.
5. GRANT RESOURCE ON TABLESPACE TO
USERNAME
2
Restricts user to creating objects only in certain
tablespaces.
DBA: access to the database objects owned by any
user including the Data Dictionary objects owned by
the user SYS.
The ability to GRANT and REVOKE database
privileges to users, and to control the logging of
database events.
The ability to perform all database management and
maintenance activities.
OBJECT SECURITY
1. TABLE OBJECT SECURITY 2
The factor that determines access rights for the user
is the access which has been set up for the specific
object.
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GRANT{OBJECT PRIV,[OBJECT PRIV.. ]ON
OBJECT TO USERNAME
The owner of an object can grant another user any of
the seven object privileges through the above
command
The privileges are as follows:
• ALTER: change the definition of a table;
• DELETE: delete rows from a table;
• INDEX: create an index on a table;
• INSERT: add rows to a table;
• REFERENCE: create a reference to a table;
• SELECT: query the data in a table; and
• UPDATE: modify the data in a table.
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GRANT OBJECT_PRIV(OBJECT_ClN, OBJECT- 2
ClN)ON OBJECT TO USERNAME
The owner of the table can restrict commands to
specific columns within the table through the
mentioned command.
3. SEQUENCE OBJECT SECURITY
Privileges are as follows:
• ALTER;
• SELECT; and
• GRANT.
VIEW SECURITY
1. VIEW SECURITY
The owner ofvthe view is by default the only user
able to access the view. In' order to allow other users
to access the view the owner must use the SQl
command GRANT.
The use of the access method granted to another
user (namely INSERT, DELETE, UPDATE) against the
view can result in the user modifying the data
contained in the base tables accessed by the view.
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It is therefore important to use the WITH CHECK
OPTION when creating a view. When the option is
not used, the user will be able to modify base tables
which are not contained in the original view.
DATA DICTIONARY
\ 1. DATA DICTIONARY 2
Is a set of views and tables within ORACLE database
which contain the following:
• all relevant information on the installation;
• security parameters that have been set;
• objects and data that exist; and
• access which has been granted to the
particular database. "
The data contained in the Data Dictionary is
maintained and modified by the ORACLE RDBMS
during the normal operation of the database. The
tables and views are created when the database is
initially defined and are contained in the SYSTEM
tablespace.
These tables and views are owned by the special user
SYS. There are three types of views:
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• USER OBJECTS: describes all objects that
current owner owns. This view can be
accessed by any user relevant to the objects
owned by the user;
\
• ALL OBJECTS: describes objects that current
owner owns or can access. This view can be
accessed by any user; and
• DBA_OBJECTS: describes all of the objects
that exist in the entire database. Can only be
accessed by user with DBA privileges.
The following views are relevant to the auditor:
• DBA_TAB_COMMENTS: description of every
table contained in the database;
• DBA COL_COMMENTS: description of every
column of every table in the database;
• DBA USERS: the user profile of every user
defined to the database;
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• DBA_TAB_GRANTS: the object privileges
granted on every table in the database; and
• DBA_COL GRANTS: the object privileges
granted on every column of every table in the
database.
ORACLE TOOLS
1. CONNECT INTERNAL
Connects a username SYS to a database.
2. SOL DBA
Primary tool for assisting the DBA in managing and ;
monitoring a database. The use of this tool does not
require the user to have an ORACLE user profile with
DBA privileges. Access to jhis tool should be
restricted from the operating system.
3. Sal NET 2
For a local database to connect to a remote database,
a database link is required. The DBLINK is an object
that resides in the local database and uniquely
defines the path to the remote database. It contains
the following information:
• network protocol;
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"• nodename;
• Dbname;
• username / password; and
• protocol options.
\
4. CREATE DATABASE LINK 2
Creates a private DB link by default that means only
the creator of the link will be allowed access to the
DB link in the database.
5. CREATE PUBLIC DATABASE LINK 2
Allows access to all users. Only users with DBA
privileges can execute this command.
6. SQl*PlUS
Tool for the ad hoc processing of Sal commands
against an ORACLE database. This tool is started
from the operating system where it accesses the
PRODUCT USER PROFilE table and enforces the
defined restrictions. This table is located in the
SYSTEM account and provides additional security to
that of the ORACLE RDBMS.
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This table should be owned and maintained by the
DBA because it is the DBA's username SYSTEM that
has all the privileges on this table. All other users
should only have SELECT access to this table.
7. SQl*REPORT WRITER 2
This is a user-friendly menu driven ORACLE program
that allows a user to create a variety of reports.
This tool supplements the security provided by the
REVOKE and GRANT commands. Restrictions that
can be enforced, include preventing users from
running the tool, preventing users from accessing
other users' reports and limiting the number of output
pages for each user.
,
,
Controlling access to the first two is accomplished
via defining the Sal*REPORT WRITER tables as
either system-owned or user-owned
"
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6. UNIX MATRIX
The following features are available(Garfinkel, 1993):
1. /etc/passwd 1
UNIX uses this file to keep track of every user on
the system. This file contains the username, real
name, identification information and basic account
information for each user.
2. passwd(1) command 2
Allows the user to change his password, forces the
user to type the password twice. The superuser uses
this command to reset the password of any user, ;
without supplying the old password.
3. bin/login program • 2
Takes the password that the user typed in,
transforms it to a block of zeros (encrypted
password) and compares it to the block stored in the
/etc/passwd file.
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4. sysadmsh{ 1) program, set default to:
"Accounts> Defaults> Passwords"
3
This forces users to use the password generator.
5. letc/group file 2
Contains the database that lists every group and its
corresponding UID.
6. su(1) command 1
Is used to change the user identity temporarily,
requires the password of the user to whom you are
changing temporarily. This can also be used to
become the superuser.
7. lusr/adm/messages file 2
Bad su attempts are logged on the console and in
this file. It is an indication of possible attempts to
gain unauthorised access.
8. Is(1) command 3
Used to list files in the current directory, as well as
access granted to users.
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9. chmod(1) command 2
Used to change a file's permission, can only change
permission if you are the owner of the file.
10. umask(1) command
A three digit octal number used to determine the file
permission for a newly created file. umask specifies
the permission you do not want to be given to newly
created files and directories.
11. chown(8) command
Allows you to change the owner of a file. In some
.
versions of UNIX only the superuser can use this
command.
12. chgrp(1) command
Allows you to change the group of a file. You can
only do this if you are the owner of the file or the
superuser. :
13. last command
Produces a list of users who haven't logged in
during the current month, to be disabled.
84
2
2
2
3
14. usr/adm/lastlog file 2
Records each user's most recent login time.
15. letc/utmp file
Keeps track of who is currently logged into the
system.
16. lusr/adm/wtmp files
Keeps track of both logins and logouts
17. lusr/adm/acct file
Logs every command run by every user.
7. CONCLUSION
3
2
2
The different components evaluated above, provide several
security features that can be used to enhance the validity control
objective.
The identified components or features that are available in the
different software layers are very similar ego username and
password required for logon etc.
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As it is not practical to implement all the security features in all
the layers, this makes the decision of which features to implement
where, even more difficult. It is thus important to keep the
interaction of the software layers in mind when deciding at which
level a particular control feature should be implemented.
It is therefore important for management to understand the
concept of applying technology to control technology, when
establishing a framework for the development of security policies
and procedures.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will evaluate whether the model developed is
a successful tool for evaluating the validity control facilities
in the predefined SAP R/3 environment.
5.2 ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY
Management is responsible for directing and controlling the
organisation's operations and for establishing, communica-
ting and monitoring organizational policies and procedures.
As for security, management have the responsi-bility to
ensure the following:
• Exposures concerning security are assessed. A
starting point for understanding the role of securitv is
to assess the risk to the integrity, confidentiality and
availability of information system data and resources.
• An organizational policy dealing with security is
established. The policy should address the following:
scope and purpose of the policy and the
facility, systems and personnel to whom it
applies;
security strategy and how it links to the
organization's general strategy;
objectives of security and methods of
achieving them;
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accountability and responsibility at all levels of
the organization; and
definition of violations and penalties for
noncompliance.
• A compliance structure is implemented. Management
encourages compliance with the policy by taking an
active role in establishing the policy, assigning
responsibility and creating a structure that enforces
and monitors adherence to policies and procedures.
The security policy and procedure requirements as specified
by management are implemented and administered by the
security officer and his team.
5.3 PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The security team 'should develop procedures for each
function of the security department. These procedures can
be divided into the following:
• designing the security structure or hierarchy; .
• granting or revoking system access;
• granting and revoking data and resource access; and
• reporting and monitoring activity.
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The procedures developed will depend on the environment
that the security team are dealing with. Concepts of using
technology to control technology should be applied by the
team when developing the procedures required by
management.
The Access Path and Path Context Models have been
successfully used to depict the SAP R/3 environment and
this proves the applicability of these models to other similar
environments. The different levels of the SAP R/3 access
path provide a variety of opportunities to control security
within the environment. Security teams should evaluate the
different components to decide which controls should be
used for each layer.
5.4 EVALUATION
The application of the specified research methodology and
~
the Access Path and Path Context Models, made it possible
to evaluate the predefined SAP R/3 environment.
The research showed that the software layers in the
predefined environment had sufficient controls and features
to ensure that only valid users can execute valid
transactions. It was also found that the different layers
provide similar security and control features.
The matrices developed will be useful to the security team
when deciding which control features to set up in which
layers to achieve effective and efficient control. It is
therefore important to consider the whole environment and
to keep a balance between protection and production.
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Research also showed that there are many technical
solutions available to implement security. Technical
solutions are rarely complete and should be used with non-
technical solutions such as security policies and procedures.
5.5 VALUE OF THIS RESEARCH TO THE AUDIT PROFESSION
The provisions that safeguard the availabilitv, access and
use of computer facilities, programs, and data, protect
against:
a) unauthorised access and use affecting current data
processing, that could affect the financial
statements, and
b) loss or destruction affecting future availability of data
processing capabilities (Davis et al 1983:Chapter 8).
The protection of current processing is included in the
accounting control and is within the required scope of the
auditor's study and evaluation of the internal accounting
control. As stated in the audit guide, 'The Auditor's Study
and Evaluation Internal Control in EDP Systems', the general
access controls are as follows:
• Access to data files and programs should be limited
to those individuals authorised to process or maintain
particular systems (Davis et al 1983:Chapter 8).
When faced with the problem of evaluating internal
accounting control and more specific, access control in a
complex SAP R/3 environment, the resultant matrices can
be used with much success.
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The Access Path and Path Context Models can also be used
by auditors as a tool to evaluate other aspects of internal
accounting controls or other similar complex environments.
5.6 CONCLUSION
Because of the above it can be said that the objectives set
for this research essay have been met.
A positive contribution has been made to the fields of
auditing accounting controls and more specific, computer
security through the application of the Access Path and
Path Context Models to the predefined SAP R/3
environment. The methodology used proved to be universal
and can be applied to other studies of computer security.
This study showed that each of the software components
in the SAP R/3 environment can be used as a grille to
prevent users from gaining unauthorised access to the next
software component. The predefined SAP R/3 environment
can therefore be deemed to have achieved the required
objective of ensuring validity of business processes.'
In conclusion, the resultant matrices have been effectively
used to evaluate the predefined environment. Although the
universal applicability has not been proven, it can serve as
a basis for further research into other similar complex
environments or other aspects of the predefined
environment, such as the application of the model to
evaluate other control objectives ego completeness,
accuracy or maintenance.
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